The Right to Refuse Life Sustaining Medical Treatment and the Noncompetent Nonterminally Ill Patient: An Analysis of Abridgment and Anarchy by Adamson, Elizabeth Helene
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 5
1-15-1990
The Right to Refuse Life Sustaining Medical
Treatment and the Noncompetent Nonterminally
Ill Patient: An Analysis of Abridgment and Anarchy
Elizabeth Helene Adamson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts
Commons, Health Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legislation Commons, and the
Medical Jurisprudence Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Helene Adamson The Right to Refuse Life Sustaining Medical Treatment and the Noncompetent Nonterminally Ill Patient: An
Analysis of Abridgment and Anarchy, 17 Pepp. L. Rev. 2 (1990)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol17/iss2/5
The Right to Refuse Life Sustaining Medical
Treatment and the Noncompetent Nonterminally Ill
Patient: An Analysis of Abridgment
and Anarchy
Dying
Is an art, like everything else.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nancy Beth Cruzan has been condemned to live.1 The Supreme
Court of Missouri2 has condemned Nancy to live for the next thirty
years3 in a persistent vegetative state4 because it failed to uphold
Nancy's right to terminate artificial nutrition and hydration as exer-
* Plath, Lady Lazarus, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE
2566 (2d ed. 1985).
1. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989). On January 11, 1983, in Jasper
County, Missouri, Nancy Beth Cruzan was in a near fatal automobile accident. As a
result of the accident, she was without oxygen for approximately 12 to 14 minutes. Id.
at 410-11. Thereafter, Nancy lapsed into a coma from which she has never recovered.
In February 1983, a feeding tube was surgically inserted to provide nutrition and hy-
dration, as Nancy was unable to receive food or water orally. Id. at 431. Subsequently,
she was found to be in a persistent vegetative state, although not terminally ill. Ac-
cording to medical testimony, she can live another 30 years in this condition. Id. at 411.
Nancy's parents, as her appointed co-guardians, sought court approval to have the
state hospital discontinue all further artificial nutrition and hydration. The trial court
granted the request and ordered the hospital to withdraw nutrition and hydration. Id.
at 410-12. However, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court's decision
and held that Nancy's co-guardians, her parents, "did not have the authority to order
the withdrawal of hydration and nutrition" as an exercise of substituted judgment on
Nancy's behalf. Id. at 426-27.
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this case. See Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
2. See supra note 1.
3. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411. Nancy currently receives artificial nutrition and
hydration through a gastrostomy tube at the Mount Vernon State Hospital. Id. at 411
& n.2. As a result of the Missouri Supreme Court's decision, she will remain in this
condition indefinitely.
4. A persistent vegetative state [hereinafter PVS] often results from cardiac or
respiratory failure accompanied by the absence of blood (ischemia) or oxygen (hyp-
oxia) to the brain. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality
(Getting the Facts Straight), 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 27, 27-28 (1988). The PVS pa-
tient is characterized by complete unconsciousness and an absence of "[v]oluntary reac-
tions or behavioral responses reflecting consciousness, volition, or emotion at the
cerebral cortical level." Id. at 28.
cised through her co-guardians, her parents. Thus, the court denied
the right of a noncompetent 5 nonterminally i116 patient to refuse life
sustaining medical treatment 7 as exercised through a surrogate
decisionmaker.8
Fortuitously, if this action had been brought in another state,9
Nancy's right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment would prob-
ably have been preserved. However, unlike the majority of states,
Missouri has chosen to deny the noncompetent nonterminally ill pa-
tient's right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment1 0 when the
right is exercised by a surrogate decisionmaker through the with-
drawal of nutrition and hydration."l Thus, although the majority of
5. Noncompetency is determined by judicial proceeding, and is characterized by
an inability to care for oneself, including the inability to make decisions regarding the
acceptance or rejection of life sustaining medical procedures. See infra notes 128-30
and accompanying text.
6. A nonterminally ill condition may be characterized by the presence of coma,
substantial brain damage, or persistent vegetative state, and the concomitant absence
of a terminal condition. A terminal condition is generally defined as an incurable con-
dition which would result in death within a short period of time regardless of the ap-
plication of life sustaining measures. See infra notes 21, 131-33 and accompanying text.
7. The right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment has three bases: (1) the
common law right of bodily integrity; (2) the constitutional right of privacy; and (3)
the statutory rights embodied in the natural death acts. See infra notes 37-74 and ac-
companying text for discussion.
Medical treatment or procedures used to sustain or prolong the life of the patient
are known by various names. See infra note 62 for statutes. The American Medical
Association [hereinafter AMA] has indicated that life prolonging medical procedures
include "medication and artificially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or
hydration." AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Op. 2.18 (1986) [hereinafter
AMA Opinion]. The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (URITA) defines life
sustaining treatment as "any medical procedure or intervention that, when adminis-
tered to a qualified patient, will serve only to prolong the process of dying." URITA
§ 1(4), 9B U.L.A. 611 (1987).
8. The term "surrogate decisionmaker" is used because the decisionmaker may
not necessarily be the patient's guardian. See In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 261 & n.1
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
9. Many states have upheld the right of the noncompetent patient to refuse life
sustaining medical treatment. See cases cited infra note 12.
10. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989); see also supra notes 1-3 and
accompanying text. In addition, other states that have not chosen to completely deny
the right of the noncompetent nonterminally ill patient, have chosen to abridge or
limit the right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment through various measures.
For example, the right to refuse medical treatment is often limited to patients who are
in a terminal condition, thereby precluding the nonterminally ill patient. Moreover,
courts often require "clear and convincing evidence" of an intent to forego medical
treatment, which is above and beyond the standard of a preponderance of the evidence
which is normally required in a civil case. See, e.g., In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 377-78,
529 A.2d 419, 425 (1987). Furthermore, natural death acts which allow the termination
of life sustaining medical procedures are limited to patients who are in a terminal con-
dition. See infra note 62 for statutes.
11. Although most courts treat the withdrawal or withholding of artificial nutri-
tion and hydration in the same way as other life sustaining procedures, some debate
remains as to whether nutrition and hydration should be classified as life sustaining
medical treatment. Compare Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016, 195
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states seek to preserve the noncompetent patient's right to refuse
medical treatment, 12 the law remains unsettled. Consequently, the
noncompetent patient's right to refuse life sustaining medical treat-
ment is subject to a wide spectrum of legal theories and analyses 13
which often are wrought with disparity and contradiction. The con-
tinuum ranges from complete nonrecognition of the noncompetent
patient's right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment 14 to preser-
vation of rights which are comparable to those of competent
Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (1983) (intravenous nutrition and hydration treated same as other
life support measures); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 160 (Del. Ch. 1980) (use of feeding
tube classified as life support measure); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 207-08, 464
N.E.2d 959, 964 (1984), review denied, 392 Mass. 1102, 465 N.E.2d 261 (1988) (no distinc-
tion drawn between nutrition and hydration and other forms of life sustaining treat-
ment); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 372-74, 486 A.2d 1209, 1235-37 (1985) (no distinction
between artificial nutrition and other life sustaining treatment) with Leach v. Akron
Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 12-13 (1980) (distinction between nutrition and
hydration and other forms of life sustaining treatment as court only allowed discontin-
uance of respirator).
12. The right of the noncompetent patient to refuse medical treatment was estab-
lished in the seminal case of In re Quinlan, in which the court held that the noncom-
petent patient's right should not be discarded due to the noncompetent status of the
patient. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
Subsequent cases have followed the Quinlan approach and have afforded the
noncompetent patient the right to refuse or discontinue medical treatment. See, e.g.,
Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 140-41, 482 A.2d 713, 721-22
(1984); Severns, 425 A.2d at 160; John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth,
452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984); In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 446-47, 321 S.E.2d 716, 722-23 (1984); In re Spring, 380 Mass.
629, 640-41, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122-23 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (1977); Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at
209-11, 464 N.E.2d at 965-66; In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 341 (Minn. 1984); Conroy, 98
N.J. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229; In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 820-21, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378
(1984).
13. See infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text. General considerations affect-
ing the noncompetent patient's right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment in-
clude the nature of the incompetency (whether the patient has or has not been
previously competent), the presence or absence of a terminal or nonterminal condition,
and the type of life sustaining medical procedure sought to be withdrawn or withheld
(nutrition and hydration or other life sustaining measures).
Once the noncompetent patient is granted the right to refuse medical treatment, an
issue arises as to how the right will be exercised on behalf of the patient. Two basic
tests are employed to implement the noncompetent patient's right: (1) the substituted
judgment test; and (2) the best interests test. See id. for a more complete explanation
of these tests.
14. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 426 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub nom.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989) (court did not allow
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from noncompetent nonterminally ill
patient).
patients. 15
In the majority of states, the competent patient has the right to re-
fuse life sustaining medical treatment. 16 This view is based upon the
common law right of bodily integrity,17 the constitutional right of pri-
vacy,' 8 and the statutory rights embodied in statutes commonly
known as natural death acts.19 Moreover, most states have extended
this right to the noncompetent patient 20 who is in a terminal condi-
tion.21 The right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment is ac-
corded to the noncompetent terminally ill patient based upon the
exercise of substituted judgment by a surrogate decisionmaker 22 or a
determination of the noncompetent patient's best interests.23
Although the noncompetent terminally ill patient generally has
the right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment, the law is less
well settled as applied to the noncompetent nonterminally ill pa-
15. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (guardian
authorized to exercise noncompetent patient's right to refuse medical treatment); In re
Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (guardian as surrogate deci-
sionmaker allowed to terminate life sustaining measures from noncompetent
nonterminally ill patient).
16. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 193-94, 209 Cal. Rptr.
220, 224 (1984); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1014-15, 195 Cal. Rptr.
484, 489 (1983); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 132, 482 A.2d
713, 718 (1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), ap-
proved, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Spring, 380 Mass. at 634, 405 N.E.2d at 119;
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 738-39, 370 N.E.2d at 424; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 346-47, 486 A.2d at
1222; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39-41, 355 A.2d at 663-64; In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420
N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
17. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
20. The right of the noncompetent patient to refuse life sustaining medical treat-
ment was first established in the aforementioned Quinlan case. The Quinlan court
stated that "[t]he only practical way to prevent destruction of the right is to permit the
guardian and family ... to render their best judgment ... as to whether [the noncom-
petent patient] would exercise it in these circumstances." Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355
A.2d at 664; see also supra note 12.
21. The terminally ill patient is frequently' defined as one who has an incurable
condition which would result in death regardless of the use of life sustaining measures.
The California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West
Supp. 1989), is illustrative of the definitions of terminal condition contained in the nat-
ural death acts. The California Natural Death Act defines terminal condition as "an
incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of the appli-
cation of life sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical judgment, pro-
duce death, and where the application of life sustaining procedures serve only to
postpone the moment of death of the patient." Id. § 7187(f). Similarly, the Uniform
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (URITA) defines terminal condition "as incurable and
irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment,
will, in the opinion of the attending physician, result in death within a relatively short
time." URITA § 1(9), 9B U.L.A. 48 (Supp. 1989) (section amended 1989).
22. See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "substi-
tuted judgment" test.
23. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "best in-
terests" test.
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tient.24 This comment proposes that the noncompetent nonter-
minally ill patient be granted the full complement of rights to refuse
life sustaining medical treatment, including the removal of nutrition
and hydration, regardless of the nonterminal status of the patient.25
Part II will explore and analyze the competent patient's right to re-
fuse life sustaining medical treatment based upon the common law
right of bodily integrity, 26 the constitutional rikht of privacy,27 and
the statutory rights embodied in the natural death acts,28 as balanced
against the countervailing state interests.29 Part III will analyze the
extension of the right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment to
the noncompetent terminally ill patient. In addition, Part III will fo-
cus on the manner in which the right is exercised on behalf of the
noncompetent patient, encompassing both the noncompetent patient
who has been previously competent and the noncompetent patient
who has never been competent. 30 Part IV will focus on the unsettled
area of the law regarding the right of the noncompetent
nonterminally ill patient to refuse life sustaining medical treatment.
Part IV also will provide a comparative survey of the noncompetent
nonterminally ill patient's right to refuse medical treatment by focus-
ing on several recent cases which either deny,31 severely abridge,32 or
preserve33 the noncompetent patient's rights.
24. Compare supra note 14 and accompanying text with supra note 15 and accom-
panying text.
25. See supra note 6.
26. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
29. The countervailing state interests asserted by most courts are the preservation
of life, the prevention of suicide, the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medi-
cal profession, and the protection of third parties. See infra notes 78-92 and accompa-
nying text for a complete discussion of the countervailing state interests.
30. In formulating the standards to be used to determine the noncompetent pa-
tient's right to refuse medical treatment, the majority of courts have drawn a distinc-
tion between noncompetent patients who have been previously competent and
noncompetent patients who have never been competent. Moreover, courts have enun-
ciated a further demarcation for the noncompetent patient who has been previously
competent based upon the presence or absence of an expressed preference regarding
the acceptance or rejection of medical treatment made while the patient was compe-
tent. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
31. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub nom.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
32. See supra note 10 for examples of methods courts use to abridge the noncom-
petent patient's right to refuse medical treatment.
33. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); In re
Browning, 543 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d
II. THE COMPETENT PATIENT'S RIGHT TO REFUSE LIFE SUSTAINING
MEDICAL TREATMENT
A. Definition of Death
The competent patient has a right to refuse life sustaining medical
treatment, more commonly known as "the right to die with dig-
nity."34 As the right to refuse medical treatment encompasses the
right to refuse treatment even if it ultimately leads to death, a defini-
tion of death is essential. The traditional definition of death, known
as the "heart-lung" definition, was characterized by termination of
the cardiovascular, respiratory, and central nervous systems.35 How-
ever, states have replaced the "heart-lung" definition by adopting a
uniform standard known as the "brain death" definition, character-
ized by the complete termination of all functions of the brain, includ-
ing the brain stem. 36
419 (1987); see infra notes 145-79 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of
these cases.
34. The phrase "the right to die with dignity" was coined to describe the right to
refuse life sustaining medical treatment, including treatment which ultimately leads to
or results in death. See Note, The Foundations of the Right to Die, 90 W. VA. L. REV.
235, 235-36 (1987) [hereinafter Right to Die]. Generally, the patient's "right to die" is
limited to the right to die naturally. See, e.g., Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7195 (West Supp. 1989) (permitting only the natural process of death);
Note, Voluntary Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 364 & n.10 (1984).
35. See Note, Equality for the Elderly Incompetent: A Proposal for Dignified
Death, 39 STAN. L. REV. 689, 694 (1987) [hereinafter Dignified Death]; see also Right to
Die, supra note 34, at 236.
36. See Right to Die, supra note 34, at 236. This definition has been amplified, and
it has been posited that brain death occurs when there is an absence of response to
external stimuli and internal need, lack of spontaneous breathing and muscular move-
ments, and no elicitable reflexes. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School
to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, in ETHI-
CAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 12 (1978).
Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia determine death either by the
heart-lung definition or the brain death definition. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120
(Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-101 (1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180
(Deering Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-136 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2401
(1989); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-4-3 (Burns 1988); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2811 (Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-202(a) (Supp.
1989); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1989); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 451.007 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-D:2 (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2-4 (1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (Page's Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (West Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 432.300 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 10203 (Purdon 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-460 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN.
CODE. ANN. § 68-3-501 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1987); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-2972 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 16-10-1 (Supp. 1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West
1989); WYo. STAT. § 35-19-101 (Supp. 1988).
Eight states determine death by the brain death definition, in the event that termi-
nation of respiration and circulation cannot be established because they are being
maintained by artificial means. See ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 382.085 (West 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.8 (West
1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West Supp. 1989); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14J5 (1021)
(Callaghan Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (Vernon 1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
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B. The Bases for the Right to Refuse Life Sustaining Medical
Treatment
The right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment has three ba-
ses: (1) the common law right of bodily integrity;37 (2) the constitu-
tional right of privacy;38 and (3) the statutory rights embodied in the
natural death acts.39 The patient's right to refuse medical treatment,
including treatment which leads to death, has its foundation in one or
more of these three bases. 40
1. The Common Law Right of Bodily Integrity
First, the right to refuse medical treatment is predicated upon the
common law right of bodily integrity. The common law right of bod-
ily integrity, which encompasses both the right to be free from non-
consensual bodily invasions, as well as the right of self autonomy was
first recognized in 1891, in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford.41
In Union Pacific Railway, the Court stated that "[n]o right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law."42
Thereafter, to preserve the patient's right of bodily integrity, the
doctrine of informed consent emerged.43 Under this doctrine, the
physician must inform the patient of his condition, prognosis, and the
ANN. art. 4447t (Vernon Supp. 1989). One state defines death only by the brain death
standard. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 302(b) (Smith-Hurd 1978).
37. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
40. Courts often predicate the denial or grant of the right to refuse medical treat-
ment upon one or more of these three bases. See, e.g., Foody v. Manchester Memorial
Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 132-33, 482 A.2d 713, 717-18 (1984) (right based upon consti-
tutional right of privacy and common law right of bodily integrity); In re Torres, 357
N.W.2d 332, 338-39 (Minn. 1984) (right based upon constitutional right of privacy, com-
mon law right of bodily integrity, and statutory provision guaranteeing patient's right
to refuse medical treatment).
41. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
42. Id. at 251.
43. At common law, medical treatment without the consent of the patient consti-
tuted a violation of bodily integrity. See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp.,
211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). In Schloendorff, the court stated that "[e]very human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93
(citation omitted).
risks and benefits of alternative methods of treatment, as well as ob-
tain the patient's consent before the physician may render treat-
ment. 44  Because informed consent is a requirement for the
acceptance or rejection of medical treatment, it is a prerequisite for
the refusal of any medical treatment, even that which ultimately
leads to death.45
2. The Constitutional Right of Privacy
Second, the right to refuse medical treatment is based upon the
constitutional right of privacy. In Griswold v. Connecticut,46 the
United States Supreme Court held that a right of privacy existed in
the penumbras of the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments.47
Thereafter, in the seminal case of Roe v. Wade,48 the Court held that
the right of privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's deci-
sion whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 49 Subsequent
Supreme Court cases have extended the right of privacy to contra-
ception,50 procreation,51 and family relationships. 52
Although the Court has stated that the right of privacy is limited,53
it has continued to maintain that fundamental rights are protected by
the constitutional right of privacy.54 Fundamental rights protected
by the Constitution are those rights which are "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty"' ' - or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition." 56 As the right to refuse medical treatment is based, in
part, upon the long established common law right of bodily integ-
rity,57 it may be considered "fundamental" and, therefore, fall within
the ambit of the constitutional right of privacy.
44. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 346-47, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985); Cantor, A Pa-
tient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus
the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 237 (1973); Dignified Death, supra
note 35, at 699. The doctrine of informed consent requires that the patient be in-
formed of the risks and benefits of all alternatives, including nontreatment.
45. See Dignified Death, supra note 35, at 699.
46. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. Griswold involved the right to use contraception within the marriage relation-
ship. The Court held that such a relationship was "within the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Id. at 485.
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. Id. at 153.
50. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception for unmarried persons
protected under right of privacy).
51. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (abortion); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Wil-
liamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterilization).
52. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (family living arrange-
ments); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage).
53. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (right of privacy is not absolute).
54. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
55. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
56. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
57. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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In the landmark case of In re Quinlan,58 the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the constitutional right of privacy encompassed a pa-
tient's right to refuse medical treatment.59 The Quinlan court stated
that the constitutional right of privacy was "broad enough to encom-
pass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain
circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to encom-
pass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain condi-
tions."60 Subsequently, many courts have adopted the reasoning of
the Quinlan court and have based the right to refuse life sustaining
medical treatment, either in part or in whole, upon the constitutional
right of privacy.61
3. The Natural Death Acts
Finally, the right to refuse medical treatment is predicated upon
the statutory rights embodied in natural death acts.6 2 These acts pro-
58. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
59. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
60. Id. (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 153).
61. See, e.g., Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 132, 482
A.2d 713, 717 (1984); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Del. Ch. 1980); John F. Ken-
nedy Memorial Hosp., Inc., v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1984); In re Spring,
380 Mass. 629, 634, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977); In re Torres, 357
N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222-23
(1985); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 60 Ohio Misc. 1, 7-10 (1980). But cf.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417-18 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
62. Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have enacted natural death
acts. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (Supp.
1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-101
to -203 (1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1989); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -575
(Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -
2430 (1989); FLA.. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12
(1985 & Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-
4501 to 4508 (1985 & Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 701-710 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 144A.1-. 11 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1985); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§§ 2921-2931 (Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1989);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -
104, -111, -201 to -206 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-.690 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to -H:16 (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (1986); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West
Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1989); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to
-1118 (Supp. 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-1-
vide for the termination of life sustaining procedures in certain cir-
cumstances. 63 Although the provisions of natural death acts vary
from state to state, most contain provisions which define life sus-
taining procedures, the type of patient to whom the act applies, pro-
cedures to execute64 and revoke65 a living will, and a grant of
immunity to health care providers.
. A life sustaining procedure typically is any medical procedure or
intervention that utilizes mechanical or artificial means to sustain,
restore, or supplant a vital function, which serves only to delay the
moment of death, or where death would be imminent regardless of
the application of such measures.66 Many states limit the definition
of life sustaining procedure by excluding the administration of medi-
cation or any medical procedure designed to alleviate pain.67 States
further circumscribe the definition by excluding the administration
of nutrition and hydration.68
Almost all of the natural death acts provide that the provisions of
the act apply only to a "qualified patient." To be considered a quali-
fied patient, the patient must comply with two elements: (1) a living
will must be executed by the patient; and (2) the patient must be in a
terminal condition.69 Consequently, the natural death acts provide a
2984 (Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (West Supp. 1989); W. VA.
CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West 1989); WYO. STAT.
§§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1988).
63. Natural death acts only apply to patients who are in a terminal condition. See
supra note 21 and accompanying text for discussion of terminal condition.
64. Generally the requirements necessary for the execution of a testamentary will
also apply to the execution of a living will. See Right To Die, supra note 34, at 248-49.
65. Revocation of a living will can occur by the destruction of the will, written
revocation, or an oral expression by the declarant which demonstrates an intent to re-
voke the will. Revocation may only be accomplished by the declarant or a person act-
ing on behalf of the declarant. See supra note 62 for statutes; see also Right To Die,
supra note 34, at 249.
66. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201 (1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 7187(c) (West Supp. 1989); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1989).
67. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201 (1986) (provide comfort or care);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(c) (West Supp. 1989) (alleviate pain); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 15-18-103(7) (Supp. 1987) (provide comfort or alleviate pain); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-8-11-4 (Burns Supp. 1989) (provide comfort, care, or alleviate pain); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 144A.2 (West 1989) (provide comfort, care, or alleviate pain); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 137-H:2 (Supp. 1988) (provide comfort, care, or alleviate pain).
68. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(4) (1986) (food or fluids); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 15-18-103(7) (Supp. 1987) (nourishment); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-2 (Supp.
1986) (fluids and nourishment); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.2(5) (West 1989) (sustenance);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2921(4) (Supp. 1988) (nutrition and hydration); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2(II) (Supp. 1988) (sustenance); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 63-3102(4) (West Supp. 1989) (nourishment and hydration); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-
20(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (nutrition and hydration); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-11-
03(6)(b) (Supp. 1989) (sustenance). Nevertheless, two states specify that nutrition or
hydration fall within the ambit of life sustaining procedures. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.12.040(b) (Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(5) (Supp. 1989).
69. See supra note 62 for statutes.
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limited foundation for the right to refuse medical treatment as they
only pertain to patients who are in a terminal condition. Terminal
condition frequently is defined as having these elements: an incur-
able or irreversible condition resulting from injury, disease, or illness
with either no chance of recovery, or death will occur regardless of
life sustaining measures, and death is imminent or only delayed by
the use of life sustaining measures. 70
Most natural death acts also contain provisions for the execution
and revocation of a "living will," which is a written directive signed
by the patient directing that life sustaining procedures be withheld or
withdrawn in the event the patient is in a terminal condition.71 If
the patient becomes incompetent or is otherwise unable to make de-
cisions regarding life sustaining procedures, the living will is deemed
to be the final expression of the patient's right to refuse medical
70. See Right to Die, supra note 34, at 247-48.
71. The California Natural Death Act directive is illustrative of the type of direc-
tive necessary for the living will authorized by natural death acts.
DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIANS
Directive made this - day of (month, year).
I , being of sound mind, willfully, and voluntarily make known my,
desire that my life shall not be artificially prolonged under the circumstances
set forth below, do hereby declare:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or illness certified
to be a terminal condition by two physicians, and where the application of
life-sustaining procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the mo-
ment of my death and where my physician determines that my death is im-
minent whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized, I direct that
such procedures be Withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die
naturally.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such
life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this directive shall be
honored by my family and physician(s) as the final expression of my legal
right to refuse medical or surgical treatment and accept the consequences
from such refusal.
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to my
physician, this directive shall have no force or effect during the course of
my pregnancy.
4. I have been diagnosed and notified at least 14 days ago as having a terminal
condition by - , M.D., whose address is - , and whose
telephone number is -. I understand that if I have not filled in the
physician's name and address, it shall be presumed that I did not have a
terminal condition when I made out this directive.
5. This directive shall have no force or effect five years from the date filled in
above.
6. I understand the full import of this directive and I am emotionally and
mentally competent to make this directive.
Signed
City, County and State of Residence
treatment.72
In addition, all of the natural death acts grant immunity7 3 from
civil liability or criminal prosecution to the physician or health care
provider in the event that life sustaining procedures are withdrawn
or withheld from a qualified patient. Other provisions which may be
included in the natural death acts are provisions regarding insurance,
penalties for withholding or forging a living will or revocation, and
provisions stating that the withdrawal or withholding of life sus-
taining procedures does not constitute suicide or homicide.74
C. The Countervailing State Interests
Although the right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment is
predicated upon the constitutional right of privacy, the right of pri-
vacy is not absolute.7 5 The patient's right of privacy must be bal-
anced against countervailing state interests. 76  However, the
countervailing'state interest must be compelling in nature to override
the patient's right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment.77 Con-
sequently, states have identified four interests which may supersede
individual privacy rights: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the preven-
tion of suicide; (3) the preservation of the ethical integrity of the
medical profession; and (4) the protection of third parties.
1. The Preservation of Life
First, the state has an interest in the preservation of life.78 This
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe him or her to be
of sound mind.
Witness
Witness
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1989).
72. However, all of the natural death acts provide that at all times the desires of
the declarant supersede the living will. See supra note 62 for statutes.
73. See id. Immunity is granted to the health care provider as long as the health
care provider acts in good faith, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(c) (1986) (good
faith), in accordance with reasonable medical standards, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-
208(b) (1986) (reasonable medical standards), or both, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-
H:9 (Supp. 1988) (good faith and reasonable medical standards).
74. See supra note 62 for statutes.
75. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (right of privacy in abortion
cases balanced against important state interests of safeguarding health, maintaining
medical standards, and protecting potential life).
76. See supra note 75 and infra notes 78-92 and accompanying text for a discussion
of countervailing state interests.
77. The state must assert a compelling state interest because the right to refuse
life sustaining medical treatment is predicated upon the constitutional right of privacy
which is a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution. See supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
78. See Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 133, 482 A.2d
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may encompass interests in the prolongation of life as well as the
sanctity of life.79 Although the state interest in the preservation of
life may seem compelling, it must be balanced against the patient's
right to refuse medical treatment. Thus, the state's interest must be
counterbalanced against the patient's prognosis, the degree of bodily
invasion necessitated by the treatment, and the probability that the
patient will return to a cognitive existence.8 0 Moreover, the interest
of the state "weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as
the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ulti-
mately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome
the State interest."s1
2. The Prevention of Suicide
Second, the state has an interest in the prevention of suicide.8 2
This interest does not necessarily prohibit the patient's right to re-
fuse medical treatment, as the rejection of medical treatment does
not constitute suicide when the patient lacks the specific intent to
die.83 Moreover, as death often results from natural causes, the pa-
713, 718 (1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), ap-
proved, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 641, 405 N.E.2d 115, 123
(1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741,
370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985); In
re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 (1981); Leach v.
Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1 (1980).
79. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub nom.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989). In Cruzan, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court stated that the "state's interest in life embraces two separate con-
cerns: an interest in the prolongation of the life ... and an interest in the sanctity of
life itself." Id. Moreover, the court indicated that the "state's concerns with the sanc-
tity of life rests on the principle that life is precious and worthy of preservation with-
out regard to its quality." Id.
80. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
81. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
82. Some courts indicate that the state interest in the prevention of suicide does
not necessarily override the patient's right to forego life sustaining medical treatment.
See, e.g., In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 210, 464 N.E.2d 959, 965 (1984); Saunders v.
State, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 50, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 514 (1985); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 116
Misc. 2d 477, 486, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706, 711 (1982). In addition, most of the natural death
acts indicate that the withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining procedures does not
constitute suicide. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7192(a) (West Supp. 1989)
("The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient
... shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide.").
83. Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (1984)
(court allowed removal of respirator from semi-comatose patient because it did not
contravene state interest in prevention of suicide since patient lacked intent to die);
Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1 (1980) (state interest in preven-
tion of suicide failed to override patient's right to refuse medical treatment because re-
tient does not initiate death by the removal of medical treatment, but
merely allows the process of death to continue unabated.8 4 Further-
more, the state's interest in the prevention of suicide is the preven-
tion of self-destruction, not the prohibition of self-determination as
excercised through a decision to forego life sustaining medical
treatment.8 5
3. The Preservation of the Ethical Integrity of the Medical
Profession
Third, the state has an interest in the preservation of the ethical
integrity of the medical profession.8 6 Ethical integrity is not neces-
sarily compromised when the patient's right to refuse medical treat-
ment is upheld as medical ethics do not always require medical
treatment or intervention.8 7 The patient's rejection of medical treat-
ment may even be consistent with medical ethics when "physicians
distinguish between curing the ill and comforting and easing the dy-
moval of respirator only demonstrates intent to forego treatment not specific intent to
die). See generally Comment, Suicidal Competence and the Patient's Right to Refuse
Lifesaving Treatment, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 707 (1987).
84. See Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at 137, 482 A.2d at 720 (death resulted from natural
causes; therefore, patient did not initiate dying process); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426,
n.l (1977) (natural causes produced death; therefore, patient did not set death process
in motion); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 351, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (1985) (death resulted
from underlying organic disease).
85. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743, 370 N.E.2d at 426; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 350-51, 486
A.2d at 1224.
86. See, e.g., Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at 135-37, 482 A.2d at 719; Leach, 68 Ohio Misc.
at 10.
87. The American Medical Association has stated that it is not unethical to discon-
tinue life sustaining medical procedures in certain circumstances:
For humane reasons, with informed consent, a physician may do what is medi-
cally necessary to alleviate severe pain, or cease or omit treatment to permit a
terminally ill patient whose death is imminent to die. However, he should not
intentionally cause death. In deciding whether the administration of poten-
tially life-prolonging medical treatment is in the best interest of the patient
who is incompetent to act in his own behalf, the physician should determine
what the possibility is for extending life under humane and comfortable con-
ditions and what are the prior expressed wishes of the patient and attitudes of
the family or those who have responsibility for the custody of the patient.
Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is beyond doubt irrevers-
ible and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the diagno-
sis and with the concurrence of the those who have responsibility for the care
of the patient, it is not unethical to discontinue all means of life prolonging
medical treatment.
Life prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artificially or
technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration. In treating a ter-
minally ill or irreversibly comatose patient, the physician should determine
whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its burdens. At all times, the dig-
nity of the patient should be maintained.
AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, statement March 15, 1986 (emphasis ad-
ded) [hereinafter AMA Statement].
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ing"88 and render treatment in accordance with this principle. Fur-
thermore, the right of the patient should be upheld and may
supersede the decision of the physician if a conflict arises between
the patient's decision and the medical profession.89
4. The Protection of Third Parties
Finally, the state has an interest in the protection of third par-
ties.90 The primary interest which the' state seeks to safeguard is the
protection of minor children from emotional and financial harm.91
However, if provision has been made for the care of minor children,
the patient's right to refuse medical treatment may override the
countervailing state interest in the protection of third parties.92
III. THE NONCOMPETENT TERMINALLY ILL PATIENT'S RIGHT TO
REFUSE LIFE SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT
A. The Recognition of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
The noncompetent terminally ill patient generally is accorded a
right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment that is similar to the
right granted to the competent patient.93 However, this right may
vary depending upon whether the noncompetent patient has been
previously competent.94
The noncompetent patient is defined as one who is unable to make
88. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 47, 355 A.2d 647, 667 (1976).
89. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 217, 741 P.2d 674, 684 (1987); Conroy,
98 N.J. at 352-53, 486 A.2d at 1225; see also AMA Statement, supra note 87. The AMA
has stated that "[t]he social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve
suffering. Where the performance of one duty conflicts with the other, the choice of
the patient, or his family or legal representative if the patient is incompetent to act in
his own behalf, should prevail." Id.
90. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla.
1984); Saunders v. State, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 50, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 514 (1985); In re Lydia E.
Hall Hosp., 116 Misc. 2d 477, 486, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706, 711 (1982).
91. See Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 137-38, 482 A.2d
713, 720 (1984); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 742-43, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977).
92. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972).
93. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
94. If the noncompetent patient has been previously competent, the majority of
courts apply the substituted judgment test if clear and convincing evidence exists of a
past expressed preference regarding acceptance or rejection of life sustaining medical
treatment made while the patient was competent. See infra notes 111-17 and accompa-
nying text for discussion of the substituted judgment test. The surrogate deci-
sionmaker, through the substituted judgment test, seeks to determine the decision the
noncompetent patient would make if the patient were competent. In the alternative,
the best interests test is used to determine the patient's right based upon the objective
medical decisions, including those decisions regarding the withdrawal
or withholding of life sustaining medical treatment.95 Because of this
inability, the noncompetent patient's right is preserved and exercised
through a surrogate decisionmaker.96 The decisionmaker's authority
and the standards used to guide the exercise of the noncompetent
patient's right depend upon the nature of the patient's
noncompetency.97
B. The Establishment of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
The noncompetent patient's right to refuse life sustaining medical
treatment was first established in the landmark case of In re Quin-
lan.98 In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the right
of Karen Ann Quinlan, a patient in a noncognitive, vegetative state,
to refuse life sustaining medical treatment based upon the constitu-
tional right of privacy as exercised on her behalf by her guardian and
family.99 The court stated that the right to terminate a noncognitive
vegetative existence was an important incident of the right of pri-
vacy, and therefore, the right could not be destroyed "solely on the
basis that [a] condition prevents [a] conscious exercise of the
choice."10 0 Thus, the court allowed Karen Quinlan's right of privacy
to be exercised on her behalf by her guardian, because it was "[t]he
best interests of the patient. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the best interests test.
However, if the noncompetent patient has never been competent, courts are more
reluctant to grant the noncompetent patient the right to refuse medical treatment. See
In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378-81, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273-75 (1981)
(substituted judgment test cannot apply to noncompetent patient who has never been
competent). Nevertheless, at least one court has applied the substituted judgment test
to a noncompetent patient who had not been previously competent. See Saikewicz, 373
Mass. at 728, 370 N.E.2d at 417; see also infra note 117 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. As used in this article, noncom-
petency refers to the inability to make decisions and it is "not a medical or a psychiat-
ric diagnostic category; it rests on a judgment of the type that an informed layperson
might make-that a patient lacks sufficient ability to understand a situation and to
make a choice in light of that understanding." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RE-
SEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHI-
CAL, MEDICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 123 (1983) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S REPORT]. Furthermore, noncompetency resulting
from the lack of capacity to make decisions is characterized by the inability to under-
stand information necessary to the decision; the inability to weigh and decide upon al-
ternatives in accordance with personal values; and the inability to communicate with
others, especially those responsible for the care of the patient. See THE HASTINGS
CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE
CARE OF THE DYING 131 (1987).
96. See supra note 8.
97. See infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
98. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
99. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
100. Id.
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only practical way to prevent destruction of the right."101 Subse-
quent cases have followed Quinlan and preserved the noncompetent
patient's right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment as exer-
cised by a surrogate decisionmaker 0 2
C. The Determination of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Since the majority of courts10 3 grant the noncompetent terminally
ill patient a right to refuse medical treatment which is similar to the
right accorded to the competent patient, no distinction exists based
upon the noncompetent status of the patient. Consequently, the
noncompetent patient's right to refuse medical treatment is deter-
mined in the same way as the competent patient's right. Thus, courts
balance the noncompetent patient's right, based upon the common
law right of bodily integrity, the constitutional right of privacy and
the statutory rights embodied in the natural death acts, 10 4 against the
countervailing state interests.105
Although the noncompetent terminally ill patient's right to refuse
medical treatment is preserved because it is exercised by a surrogate
decisionmaker, the determination of this right often depends upon
101. Id. The court stated that if the guardian elected to exercise the right of pri-
vacy on behalf of the patient, "this decision should be accepted by a society the over-
whelming majority of whose members would, we think, in similar circumstances,
exercise such a choice in the same way for themselves or for those closest to them."
Id.
102. See, e.g., Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 133, 482
A.2d 713, 718 (1984) ("To deny the exercise because the patient is unconscious or in-
competent would be to deny the right. It is incumbent upon the state to afford an in-
competent the same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in competent
persons.") (citations omitted); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334,
1347 (Del. 1980) ("[A court] may recognize the right of a guardian ... to vicariously
assert the constitutional right of a comatose ward to accept medical care or to refuse
it."); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 634, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980) ("[A] competent person
has a general right to refuse medical treatment in appropriate circumstances .... The
same right is also extended to an incompetent person to be exercised through a 'substi-
tuted judgment' on his behalf."); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 359-60, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229
(1985) ("The right of an adult who... was once competent, to determine the course of
her medical treatment remains intact even when she is no longer able to assert that
right or to appreciate its effectation."); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio
Misc. 1, 9 (1980) ("[Ilt would be difficult to deny the existence of the right of a termi-
nally, incurably ill and permanently semi-comatose person to decide his or her own
treatment.").
103. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 37-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three ba-
ses upon which the right to refuse medical treatment is predicated.
105. See supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the counter-
vailing state interests.
the noncompetent status of the patient. Some courts have estab-
lished a demarcation between patients who are presently noncom-
petent but have been previously competent and those patients who
are currently noncompetent but have never been competent.10 6 In
addition, some courts have enunciated a further demarcation among
noncompetent patients who previously have been competent, based
upon the presence or absence of a past expressed preference regard-
ing the acceptance or rejection of medical treatment made by the pa-
tient when competent.1 0 7
D. The Exercise of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Courts have used two tests1 08 to implement the noncompetent pa-
tient's right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment: (1) a subjec-
tive test based upon the "substituted judgment" of the patient's
family or guardian;109 and (2) an objective test which focuses on the
106. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
107. A past expressed intent regarding medical treatment, whether oral or written,
is determinative of the patient's decision to forego treatment. See Right to Die, supra
note 34, at 267. However, many courts require a showing of clear and convincing evi-
dence of past intention to support a decision to terminate treatment. See, e.g., In re
Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 384-
85, 529 A.2d 419, 429 (1987). See generally In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 372 (1984).
The Browning court defined clear and convincing evidence in the following manner:
[C]lear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence must be found to
be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly
remembered; the testimony must be precise and explicit and the witnesses
must be lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be of
such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be'
established.
Browning, 543 So. 2d at 273 (quoting Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983)). The Browning court further held that "[i]t is possible for the
evidence in such a case to be clear and convincing, even though some evidence may be
inconsistent. Likewise, it is possible for the evidence to be uncontroverted and yet not
be clear and convincing." Id. (citation omitted).
108. Some courts employ a combination of the subjective substituted judgment test
and the objective best interests test to determine the right of the noncompetent pa-
tient to refuse life sustaining medical treatment. See, e.g., Foody v. Manchester Memo-
rial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 138-39, 482 A.2d 713, 720-21 (1984) (subjective
substituted judgment test is primary test used, but if evidence of patient's intent is ab-
sent, objective best interests test is applied); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360-68, 486 A.2d
1209, 1229-33 (1985) ("subjective," "limited-objective," and "pure-objective" tests used).
Moreover, courts may determine the applicable hierarchy of tests to be employed de-
pending upon the degree of evidence present regarding the patient's expressed prefer-
ence for refusal of medical treatment. See Peter, 108 N.J. at 384-85, 529 A.2d at 429 (if
clear and convincing evidence is present, Conroy subjective test is used, but if clear and
convincing evidence is absent, substituted judgment test is applied) (for an explanation
of the Conroy subjective test, see infra note 167).
109. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926
(Fla. 1984); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 634, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980); In re Hier, 18
Mass. App. Ct. 200, 207, 464 N.E.2d 959, 963-64 (1984). But cf. Weber, Substituted Judg-
ment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 131 (1985) ("[Tlhe substi-
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patient's "best interests."11 0
1. The Substituted Judgment Test
The substituted judgment test is the most common standard"'l
used to implement the noncompetent patient's right to refuse medi-
cal treatment. Substituted judgment is a subjective standard112
which requires a surrogate decisionmaker to act as the noncompetent
patient would act under the same circumstances if the patient were
competent.113 The substituted judgment test generally is used in the
case of the noncompetent patient who has been previously compe-
tent, when clear and convincing evidence exists that the noncom-
petent patient would refuse life sustaining medical treatment if the
patient had the ability to make the decision. 114
Thus, when the noncompetent patient has been previously compe-
tent, the test often is based upon the patient's past expressed prefer-
ence regarding life sustaining medical treatment."15 However, some
tuted judgment standard . . . suffers from theoretical incoherence and practical
unworkability, and facilitates the exploitation and abuse of incompetent individuals.").
110. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 221-22, 741 P.2d 674, 688-89
(1987); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 338-39 (Minn. 1984).
111. See Dignified Death, supra note 35, at 708 ("The most commonly applied stan-
dard is substituted judgment.").
112. The substituted judgment test is regarded as a subjective test because the sur-
rogate decisionimaker must make the decision that the noncompetent patient would
have made if competent, even if this conflicts with or is different from the choice the
surrogate would make. See In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 272-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989). Thus, the decisionmaker does not take into consideration any objective factors,
and the decision is based upon the patient's desires. Id.
113. See cases cited supra note 109; see also PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 95, at
132 (noting that the decisionmaker "attempt[s] to reach the decision that the incapaci-
tated person would make if he or she were able to choose") (footnote omitted).
The substituted judgment standard was first recognized in In re Quinlan. The Quin-
lan court stated that:
[The right to refuse medical treatment] should not be discarded solely on the
basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice. The
only practical way to prevent destruction of the right is to permit the guardian
and family . . . to render their best judgment . . . as to whether she would
exercise it in these circumstances. If their conclusion is in the affirmative this
decision should be accepted by a society the overwhelming majority of whose
members would, we think, in similar circumstances, exercise such a choice in
the same way for themselves or for those closest to them.
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41-42, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
114. See, e.g., Browning, 543 So. 2d at 272-73 (surrogate decisionmaker must con-
sider the following factors in determining the decision the patient would have made:
presence of a living will, verbal statements made when the patient was competent, pa-
tient's religious beliefs, and character evidence from family members and friends of
the patient).
115. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
courts have applied the substituted judgment test even when there
was no clear and convincing evidence of a past expressed intention
regarding medical treatment.116 In addition, at least one court has
applied the substituted judgment test to a noncompetent patient who
was never competent or able to express a preference regarding life
sustaining medical treatment.117
2. The "Best Interests" Test
The second test used to implement the noncompetent patient's
right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment focuses on the objec-
tive "best interests" 118 of the patient. The best interests test is used
493 (1983); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 159 (Del. Ch. 1980); John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984); Saunders v. State, 129 Misc. 2d
45, 54, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 517 (1985); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 116 Misc. 2d 477, 487-88,
455 N.Y.S.2d 706, 712 (1982); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 7-8
(1980).
116. See Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 140, 482 A.2d
713, 720-21 (1984) (no expressed intent by patient, but court applied substituted judg-
ment test and authorized termination of life sustaining measures); In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 640, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122 (1980) (court applied substituted judgment test in
absence of an expressed intent by patient, based on opinion of patient's wife and son
that patient would have refused medical treatment if competent).
117. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977). In Saikewicz, the patient, Joseph Saikewicz, was severely mentally
retarded and had been diagnosed with acute leukemia. Id. at 729, 370 N.E.2d at 419-20.
Other than the leukemia, Saikewicz was in good health, although he had an I.Q. of 10
and a mental age of two years and eight months. Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420. Eventu-
ally, the court appointed a guardian ad litem, who recommended that Saikewicz not
undergo chemotherapy for treatment of the leukemia due to the adverse side effects.
Id. at 729-30, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
The court agreed with the guardian ad litem's decision arid applied the substituted
judgment test to determine whether Saikewicz should receive the treatment. The
court stated that the substituted judgment test was "subjective in nature-that is, the
goal is to determine with as much accuracy as possible the wants and needs of the indi-
vidual involved." Id. at 750, 370 N.E.2d at 430 (footnote omitted). The court proceeded
to apply the substituted judgment test and found that if Saikewicz had been compe-
tent, he would have decided to forego the treatment. Id. at 754-55, 370 N.E.2d at 431-
32.
In applying the substituted judgment test, the court balanced the factors favoring
chemotherapy, i.e., most patients choose chemotherapy, and the possibility of prolong-
ing life, against the factors militating against chemotherapy, i.e., the patient's age, the
potential side effects, the low possibility of remission, the certainty that the treatment
would produce immediate suffering, the patient's lack of ability to cooperate in the
treatment, and the resultant quality of life if treatment caused remission. Id. at 753-54,
370 N.E.2d at 431-32. But cf In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 380-82, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73,
438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274-76, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) (substituted judgment test
cannot be used to determine if life sustaining medical treatment can be withdrawn
from a noncompetent patient who has never been competent because it is not possible
to determine what the patient's wishes would have been if competent).
118. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 221-22, 741 P.2d 674, 688-89 (1987); In re
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 338 (Minn. 1984). The best interests standard is considered to
be the traditional approach used to determine the right of the noncompetent patient
and contains a "presumption in favor of life, health, and best interests of the patient."
Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging Technol-
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when evidence of a patient's past expressed preference regarding life
sustaining medical treatment is absent.119 Under this test, the court
or guardian seeks to act in the best interests of the patient, based
upon such objective factors as the relief from physical suffering, the
probability of restoration of functioning, and the quality and duration
of the patient's life.1 20 The court also may consider whether the ben-
efits received by the patient from the treatment outweigh the
burdens.121
It is more or less settled that the noncompetent terminally ill pa-
tient has the right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment,
although a wide variety and combination of standards may be em-
ployed to implement this right. Courts seem particularly willing to
afford the noncompetent terminally ill patient this right, based upon
the substituted judgment test or the best interests test, when the pa-
tient is in a terminal condition and the prognosis is dim.122 However,
as will be discussed in Part IV, courts are far less willing to grant the
noncompetent nonterminally i11123 patient the right to refuse medical
treatment, and in some cases may entirely abridge the right merely
because the patient is not in a terminal condition.124
ogy and Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795, 824 (1980). Thus, com-
mentators have suggested that because the best interests test contains a presumption
in favor of life, it encompasses the administration of procedures necessary to preserve
life, and thereby precludes the alternative of nontreatment or the withholding of life
sustaining measures. See id.; Weber, supra note 109, at 133-34 ("flIt is far from intui-
tive that death can be in one's best interest."). But cf. PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note
95, at 181-83 (continuance of life sustaining medical treatment may not serve best in-
terests of patient).
119. See Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689 (when reliable evidence of pa-
tient's intent is absent, best interests test is used); see also PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra
note 95, at 136 ("[D]ecisionmaking for incapacitated patients should be guided by the
principle of substituted judgment .... When a patient's likely decision is unknown,
however, a surrogate decisionmaker should use the best interests standard .... ).
120. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689; see PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra
note 95, at 135.
121. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
490-91 (1983) (chance of improvement weighed against pain or intrusion involved in
the treatment).
122. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 141-89 and accompanying text.
124. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989); see also infra notes 180-89 and
accompanying text.
IV. THE NONCOMPETENT NONTERMINALLY ILL PATIENT'S RIGHT TO
REFUSE LIFE SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT
Although the noncompetent terminally ill patient generally has
the right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment,125 the law is less
well settled as applied to the noncompetent nonterminally ill patient.
No definitive standard exists to determine the right of the noncom-
petent nonterminally ill patient to refuse medical treatment.126
Moreover, although the tests employed to implement the right ap-
pear to be clear, there is a wide variety of judicial interpretation and
analyses, and in addition, the tests are often the result of hybridiza-
tion and combination.127
A. Definitions: Noncompetency and Nonterminal flIness
Noncompetency usually is defined as the inability to make in-
dependent decisions or to exercise personal autonomy, including the
absence of an ability to make decisions regarding the rejection or ac-
ceptance of life sustaining medical treatment.128 Noncompetency
typically is determined in a judicial proceeding,129 whereby the court
appoints a guardian for the noncompetent patient if it determines
that the patient is unable to provide for his own care or to manage
his affairs.130
The nonterminally ill patient is characterized by the absence of a
terminal condition.131 However, even in the absence of a terminal
condition, the patient may still be in a severely debilitated condition
characterized by the presence of coma, 132 substantial brain damage,
or persistent vegetative state.133 Thus, the primary distinction is that
125. See supra notes 93-121 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 141-89 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text. Courts will generally employ
the substituted judgment test, the best interests test, or a combination or variation
thereof to determine the right of the noncompetent patient to refuse medical
treatment.
128. See Dignified Death, supra note 35, at 704.
129. For a discussion of judicially determined guardianship proceedings, see
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1344-45 (Del. 1980); Super-
intendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 755-59, 370 N.E.2d
417, 432-35 (1977).
130. See generally UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT, 8A
U.L.A. 437 (1989); Quinn, The Best Interests of Incompetent Patients: The Capacity for
Interpersonal Relationships as a Standard for Decisionmaking, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 897
(1988).
131. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for a definition of terminal condition.
132. Coma is characterized by "the absence of consciousness or the lack of both
wakefulness and awareness." Johnson, Withholding Fluids and Nutrition: Identify-
ing the Populations at Risk, 2 ISSUES IN L. & MED.' 189, 191-92 (1986). Coma is also
characterized by a sleeplike state of unarousal resulting from damage to the brain
stem. Cranford, supra note 4, at 28.
133. See Johnson, supra note 132, at 195 (noting that PVS "is characterized by irre-
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in a terminal condition, death is imminent regardless of the use of
life sustaining measures, or the application of life sustaining proce-
dures merely postpones the time of death.
B. Distinctions: Ordinary Theatment versus Extraordinary
Treatment; Nutrition and Hydration versus Other Medical
Treatment
1. Ordinary Treatment versus Extraordinary Treatment
Courts have drawn two distinctions which impact upon the with-
drawal or withholding of life sustaining medical treatment from the
noncompetent patient: (1) ordinary treatment versus extraordinary
treatment;13 4 and (2) nutrition and hydration versus other medical
treatment.135 The first distinction arises between medical treatment
which is considered to be "ordinary" as opposed to treatment which
is deemed to be "extraordinary." Ordinary measures are medication,
treatment, and procedures which provide a "reasonable hope of bene-
fit for the patient and which can be obtained and used without exces-
sive expense, pain, or other inconvenience.' '1 36 Extraordinary
measures may be viewed as the converse of ordinary measures. 137
Some courts have predicated the noncompetent patient's right to re-
fuse life sustaining medical treatment upon the "extraordinary" na-
ture of the treatment, and have allowed the discontinuance of
medical treatment only if the treatment is found to be extraordi-
nary.138 However, other courts have disregarded the distinction be-
tween ordinary and extraordinary treatment, and have determined
the discontinuance of treatment independent of whether the life sus-
versible cessation of cognitive or higher functions of the brain but persistence of the
vegetative functions of the brainstem"); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
134. See infra note 138 for cases permitting the refusal of extraordinary medical
treatment.
135. See cases cited inkfra note 140.
136. Quinn, supra note 130, at 919 n.135; see also E. KLUGE, THE ETHICS OF DELIB-
ERATE DEATH 18-21 (1981).
137. "Extraordinary" measures are medication, treatment, and procedures which
are costly, produce excessive pain or inconvenience, or measures which do not provide
a "reasonable hope of benefit." Quinn, supra note 130, at 919 n.135; see also E. KLUGE,
supra note 136, at 19 (extraordinary measures are extremely expensive, painful, diffi-
cult, or dangerous).
138. See, e.g., Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 135-37, 482
A.2d 713, 719-20 (1984). (respirator classified as extraordinary treatment, therefore re-
moval allowed); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc., v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921,
926 (Fla. 1984) (life support equipment classified as extraordinary measure, therefore
removal permitted).
taining measure is extraordinary in nature. 139
2. Nutrition and Hydration versus Other Medical Treatment
The second distinction made in regard to life sustaining medical
treatment is whether nutrition and hydration should be classified as
life sustaining medical treatment. Courts generally view nutrition
and hydration as a form of life sustaining medical treatment,140 and
therefore, the noncompetent patient has the right to refuse nutrition
and hydration in the same manner as other medical treatment.
C. Diversity: A Comparative Survey
A comparative survey of several recent cases141 addressing the
right of the noncompetent nonterminally ill patient to refuse life sus-
taining medical treatment reveals that courts use a broad range of
tests and analyses142 to grant or deny this right. The continuum
ranges from nonrecognition and subsequent denial143 of the right to
refuse medical treatment, to the complete preservation of the
noncompetent nonterminally ill patient's right to refuse medical
treatment, albeit through the employment of a wide variety of
tests.144 Thus, no definitive standard exists to determine whether the
noncompetent nonterminally ill patient has the right to refuse medi-
cal treatment, nor is there, in the event that the right is granted, a
definitive test employed to determine the method or procedure
whereby the patient's right may be exercised.
1. In re Browning: Substituted Judgment and oUp-to-date
Evidence Test
In In re Browning,145 the court adopted the substituted judgment
139. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
491 (1983); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 159-60 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 370-72, 486 A.2d 1209, 1234-36 (1985).
140. See In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 954-55 (Me. 1987); Conroy, 98 N.J. at 372-74,
486 A.2d at 1235-37; In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 559-65, 747 P.2d 445, 452-55 (1987);
see also supra notes 11, 68 and accompanying text. Thus, the provision of nutrition and
hydration is viewed as medical treatment and not maintenance of the patient's life.
See Quinn, supra note 130, at 921-24; AMA Opinion, supra note 7.
141. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); In re Browning,
543 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988),
cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989);
In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); see also inkfra notes 145-89 and accompa-
nying text.
142. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 221-22, 741 P.2d at 688-89 (best interests test); Brown-
ing, 543 So. 2d at 272-73 (substituted judgment test); Peter, 108 N.J. at 384-85, 529 A.2d
at 429 (Conroy subjective test used if cleal and convincing evidence present; if not,
Quinlan approach used).
143. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 418, 426.
144. See supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
145. 543 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Browning involved an 89-year-old
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test, but coupled it with a requirement that the surrogate deci-
sionmaker obtain up-to-date evidence on four key issues.146 The
court also formulated comprehensive guidelines 147 to determine the
right of the noncompetent nonterminally ill patient to refuse medical
treatment. In fashioning a remedy which is applicable to all cases in-
volving adult incompetence, regardless of the patient's prognosis or
mental condition,148 the court adopted an approach which diverges
from most case law in this area.149 Through this standard, the court
sought to determine the patient's right to refuse medical treatment
without drawing a distinction between the terminal or nonterminal
condition of the patient or the source of the noncompetence, such as
brain damage, persistent vegetative state, or coma.
In adopting comprehensive guidelines, the Browning court em-
ployed a balancing test to weigh the factors which affect the right to
forego life sustaining medical treatment.150 The primary factors
which must be evaluated are the patient's physical condition and
mental condition.151 Other factors152 which may be considered are:
the patient's right of privacy and procedures in accord with this
right,153 the participation of all necessary parties to the decision,154
the promptness with which the denial or grant of the right must be
noncompetent patient who received sustenance through a nasogastric tube as a result
of substantial brain damage due to a massive stroke. Id. at 261. Subsequently, the
guardian's petition to have the nasogastric tube removed was denied. Id. at 274. The
district court of appeal held that the guardian could make the decision to terminate
life support measures and granted the guardian's motion for rehearing in light of the
comprehensive guidelines established by the court. Id. at 274-75.
146. See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the four
issues.
147. The court adopted this approach for two main reasons: (1) to avoid minor vari-
ations in diagnosis and definition which often lead to incongruous results; and (2) to
adapt to and accommodate change in technology and perspective. Browning, 543 So. 2d
at 268.
148. Id.
149. Most courts distinguish noncompetent patients on the basis of the presence or
absence of a terminal or nonterminal condition. Moreover, courts often deny or grant
the noncompetent patient's right to refuse medical treatment based on the nature of
the incompetency, such as coma, persistent vegetative state, or brain damage. See
supra notes 93-121 and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 268-69. Another type of balancing approach used by courts is a cost ben-
efit analysis, coupled with a limited resource approach. See generally Alexander,
Death by Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 67 (1988).
151. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 268.
152. Id. at 268-69.
153. Id. at 269.
154. The court based the noncompetent nonterminally ill patient's right to refuse
medical treatment on Florida's constitutional right of privacy. Id. at 266-67.
made,155 the use of the substituted judgment test by the surrogate
decisionmaker in the exercise of the decision,156 and the recognition
by the surrogate decisionmaker of the importance of the counter-
vailing state interests.157
In addition to the adoption of the balancing test, the Browning
court held that the surrogate decisionmaker must obtain current evi-
dence on four issues in order to choose to forego life sustaining medi-
cal treatment on behalf of the noncompetent patient:i58
(1) Is the patient suffering from a medical condition which would permit the
patient, if competent, to forego life-sustaining medical treatment? 1 5 9
(2) Is there any reasonable probability that the patient will regain compe-
tency so that this right could be self-exercised by the patient?1 6 0
(3) Is the patient's personal decision on this subject sufficiently clear that the
guardian can make a substituted judgment?
(4) Is the patient's right to forego medical treatment outweighed by state in-
terests under the Satz standards?1 6 1
155. The decision must be made promptly to avoid a situation in which the right to
refuse medical treatment is granted after the patient has died. For cases in which the
patient died before the final judgment was rendered, but the court did not render the
issue nonjusticiable despite mootness, see, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207,
313-14, 741 P.2d 674, 680-81 (1987) (issue of public importance which is capable of repe-
tition yet avoiding review); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 189, 209
Cal. Rptr. 220, 221 (1984) (issue capable of repetition); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 439-40,
321 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1984) (issue capable of repetition yet avoiding review); In re Far-
rell, 108 N.J. 335, 347, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (1987) (issue of extreme importance likely to
arise in the future).
156. Furthermore, the court adopted procedures outlining the scope of judicial re-
view in the event that the surrogate decisionmaker chooses to exercise the patient's
right to refuse medical treatment outside of the judicial forum. Browning, 543 So. 2d
at 273-74. The court is empowered to review the surrogate's decision regarding the pa-
tient's medical condition, the competency of the patient, the choice the patient would
have made if competent, and the countervailing state interests. Id. In reviewing the
surrogate's decision, the court must determine that the decisionmaker adhered to rules
of law, based the decision upon clear and convincing evidence, and acted in good faith.
Id. Moreover, the court also must determine independently that the state's interests
do not override the patient's right to refuse medical treatment. Id.
157. See supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the counter-
vailing state interests.
158. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 271. Moreover, the evidence must satisfy the clear and
convincing standard. Id. at 273; see supra note 107 for a definition of clear and convinc-
ing evidence.
159. All available medical evidence, including certificates made by physicians, must
be considered in order to determine the patient's medical condition. Browning, 543 So.
2d at 271. The certificates should contain information on the patient's present medical
status, the amount of pain the patient experiences, the medical treatment sought to be
withdrawn, the prognosis, and a determination by the physician as to whether termi-
nation of treatment is consistent with medical ethics. Id. at 271-72.
160. If a reasonable probability exists, then the decision to forego medical treat-
ment must be postponed. Id. at 272.
161. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), approved, 379
So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). In Satz, the court followed the traditional balancing test to de-
termine the right of a competent, terminally ill patient to remove a mechanical respi-
rator. Id. at 161-64. The Satz court balanced the patient's right to refuse medical
treatment based on the constitutional right of privacy and the common law right of
bodily integrity against the countervailing state interests of the preservation of life, the
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Through the adoption of comprehensive guidelines that balance
those factors which impact the decision to forego medical treatment,
and the use of current evidence on the four aforementioned issues,
the Browning court sought to provide workable and flexible guide-
lines to aid in the determination of the patient's right to refuse medi-
cal treatment. The Browning court has formulated a uniform
approach which will eliminate the minor variations, albeit often not
legally justifiable, 'which frequently characterize decisions in this
area. The inherent flexibility also will accommodate change in medi-
cal technology as well as in ethical and legal perspectives.
2. In re Peter: Conroy and Quinlan Revisited-The Hierarchical
Approach
In In re Peter,162 the New Jersey Supreme Court turned to two of
its seminal decisions, In re Quinlan 163 and In re Conroy,164 for assist-
ance, and subsequently fashioned a hierarchical two-step approach 165
to determine the right of the noncompetent nonterminally ill patient
to refuse medical treatment. The Peter court specifically indicated
that the noncompetent nonterminally ill patient should be granted
the right to refuse medical treatment: "[a]ll patients, competent or
incompetent . . . terminally ill or not terminally ill, are entitled to
choose whether or not they want life-sustaining medical
treatment."166
Applying a two-step hierarchical approach, the Peter court held
that if clear and convincing evidence exists that the patient would re-
fuse treatment if competent, then the Conroy subjective test,16 7
protection of third parties, the prevention of suicide, and the maintenance of the ethi-
cal integrity of the medical profession. Id.; see supra notes 37-92 and accompanying
text.
162. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
163. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
164. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
165. See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text for explanation.
166. Peter, 108 N.J. at 372, 529 A.2d at 423 (emphasis added).
167. The Conroy court formulated three tests to guide the determination of the pa-
tient's right to forego medical treatment. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 360-61, 365-67, 486 A.2d at
1229, 1232. The first test is known as the "subjective" test, and is analogous to the sub-
stituted judgment test adopted by other courts. The subjective test is employed when
there is clear and convincing evidence that the patient would refuse medical treatment
if the patient were competent. Thus, the patient's right may be exercised through the
substituted judgment of the surrogate decisionmaker. Id. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229.
The second test established is known as the "limited-objective" test. It is employed
when clear and convincing evidence is absent although "some trustworthy evidence"
exists that the patient would have chosen to refuse treatment, and the burdens of con-
which is akin to the substituted judgment test, should be applied.
However, if clear and convincing evidence is absent, the guidelines
and procedures established in Quinlan should be used to determine
the noncompetent nonterminally ill patient's right.168 Under Quin-
lan, the surrogate decisionmaker must decide that the patient would
forego medical treatment, the attending physician must concur in
this decision, and the patient's medical condition must be substanti-
ated by both the attending physician and the hospital ethics commit-
tee in order to support the right to refuse medical treatment.169
Under both the Conroy and Quinlan standards adopted by the Pe-
ter court, the surrogate decisionmaker must seek to make the deci-
sion regarding the acceptance or rejection of medical treatment that
the noncompetent patient would make if competent. However, the
right to refuse medical treatment is limited under each test. The
Conroy subjective test is limited by the requisite standard of clear
and convincing evidence which must be satisfied in order for the
right to be granted.17o Although not restricted by the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard,171 the Quinlan approach is limited by the
procedural guidelines necessary to support the patient's right to re-
fuse medical treatment.172 Nevertheless, the Peter court has sought
to preserve the noncompetent nonterminally ill patient's right to re-
fuse medical treatment through a substituted judgment analysis, re-
gardless of the degree of evidence present.
3. Rasmussen v. Fleming: The Best Interests Test
In Rasmussen v. FKeming,173 the Supreme Court of Arizona pri-
tinued existence outweigh the benefits received by the patient. Id. at 365-66, 486 A.2d
at 1232.
The final test formulated is known as the "pure-objective" test and is used when
there is no evidence of the patient's wishes regarding the acceptance or rejection of
medical treatment. Id. at 366-67, 486 A.2d at 1232. Under the pure-objective test, for
treatment to be terminated the burdens of existence resulting from the administration
of the treatment must "clearly and markedly" outweigh the benefits received by the
patient, and the continued administration of the treatment must be deemed to be inhu-
mane because of the pain produced by the treatment. Id.
168. In re-Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
169. Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
170. Peter, 108 N.J. at 377-78, 529 A.2d at 425 (Conroy subjective test applicable only
if clear and convincing evidence present that patient would refuse treatment if
competent).
171. As the Quinlan approach is employed in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence, this standard of evidence is not a prerequisite. Rather, surrogate deci-
sionmakers must exercise their "best judgment" in determining whether medical
treatment should be refused. Id. (citing Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664).
172. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
173. 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987). Rasmussen involved a nonterminally ill pa-
tient who was in a persistent vegetative state as a result of strokes and subsequent
neuromuscular or brain damage. Id. at 212, 741 P.2d at 679. The guardian petitioned to
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marily focused on the best interests test 174 to determine the right of
the noncompetent nonterminally ill patient to forego life sustaining
medical treatment. Although the court did not specifically adopt the
substituted judgment test, it indicated that the substituted judgment
test was primarily limited to situations in which the noncompetent
patient had expressed a preference for rejection or acceptance of
medical treatment while competent.175 The Rasmussen court indi-
cated that in the absence of such an expressed preference or "[w]here
no reliable evidence of a patient's intent exists . . .the substituted
judgment standard provides little, if any, guidance to the surrogate
decisionmaker and should be abandoned in favor of the 'best inter-
ests' standard."176 The court concluded that the best interests of a
patient in a chronic vegetative state, but nonterminal condition,
would be best advanced by the placement of "Do not Resuscitate"' 77
and "Do not Hospitalize" orders on the patient's records; thus, the
court subsequently granted the patient's right to refuse medical
treatment.17
8
The Rasmussen decision is noteworthy because the court concluded
that the best interests of the patient would be served by granting the
patient's right to forego life sustaining measures, contrary to the
traditional presumption in favor of life and administration of medical
treatment which is presumed to characterize the best interests
test.179 Thus, although the Rasmussen court applied the traditional
have DNR ("do not resuscitate") and DNH ("do not hospitalize") orders placed on the
patient's medical records. Id.
174. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "best in-
terests" test.
175. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 221-22, 741 P.2d at 688-89; see Barber v. Superior
Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (1984); Foody v. Manchester
Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 139-40, 482 A.2d 713, 721-22 (1984); In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 364, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (1985) ("[I]n the absence of adequate proof of the
patient's wishes, it is naive to pretend that the right to self-determination serves as the
basis for substituted decision-making."); see also supra notes 114-17 and accompanying
text.
176. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689.
177. See generally Rabkin, Gillerman & Rice, Orders Not to Resuscitate, in ETHICAL
ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 176 (1978); Robertson, Legal Criteria for Orders Not to
Resuscitate. A Response to Justice Liacos, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREAT-
ING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 159 (1982).
178. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689. Under the best interests stan-
dard, an accurate evaluation "will encompass consideration of the satisfaction of pres-
ent desires, the opportunities for future satisfactions, and the possibility of developing
or regaining the capacity for self-determination." PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 95,
at 135.
179. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
test, which militates against the termination of life sustaining medi-
cal treatment, the court, nevertheless, granted the patient's right to
forego medical treatment.
4. Cruzan v. Harmon: Nonrecognition and Denial of the Right
to Refuse Medical Treatment
In Cruzan v. Harmon,18 0 the court denied the right of a noncom-
petent nonterminally ill patient to refuse life sustaining medical
treatment.18 ' Although the court appeared to predicate the denial of
the right upon the lack of requisite evidence necessary to satisfy the
substituted judgment test, 8 2 the court's denial implicates much
broader concerns, as it failed to acknowledge that the noncompetent
patient has the right to refuse medical treatment.
By implication, the Cruzan court indicated that the right to refuse
medical treatment has no basis in the constitutional right of pri-
vacy.183 The court stated that "we carry grave doubts as to the appli-
cability of privacy rights to decisions to terminate the provision of
food and water to an incompetent patient."' 8 4 The court further im-
plied that the noncompetent patient may not have a common law
right to refuse medical treatment18 5 because the informed consent
necessary for refusal is absent due to the noncompetency of the pa-
180. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub non. Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989); see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text for
discussion of the factual situation in the Cruzan case.
181. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 426. The Cruzan court held:
that the co-guardians do not have authority to order the withdrawal of hydra-
tion and nutrition to Nancy. We further hold that the evidence offered at
trial as to Nancy's wishes is inherently unreliable and thus insufficient to sup-
port the co-guardians claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's be-
half. The burden of continuing the provision of food and water, while
emotionally substantial for Nancy's loved ones, is not substantial for Nancy.
The State's interest is in the preservation of life, not only Nancy's life, but
also the lives of persons similarly situated yet without the support of a loving
family. This interest outweighs any rights invoked on Nancy's behalf to ter-
minate treatment in the face of the uncertainty of Nancy's wishes and her
own right to life.
Id.
182. Id. The patient's co-guardians advocated that the patient's statements alone,
which expressed a preference for the refusal of medical treatment, were sufficient evi-
dence to satisfy the substituted judgment test. Id. at 424. However, the court held that
the requisite clear and convincing standard of evidence had not been met, and there-
fore denied the patient's right to refuse medical treatment. Id. at 426. The court
stated that "'informally expressed reactions to other people's medical condition and
treatment do not constitute clear proof of a patient's intent.'" Id. at 424 (citations
omitted).
183. See id. at 418. This clearly is against the weight of authority, as courts gener-
ally predicate the right to refuse medical treatment, either in part or in whole, upon
the fundamental right of privacy. See supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
184. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 418.
185. The right to refuse medical treatment is often based upon the common law
right of bodily integrity. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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tient.'8 6 Thus, in effect, the Cruzon court failed to acknowledge that
the noncompetent patient has the right to refuse medical treatment.
Despite the initial nonrecognition of the right to refuse medical
treatment, the Cruzan court proceeded to balance the patient's inter-
est against the countervailing state interests, particularly the state's
interest in the preservation of life.'8 7 The court subsequently
subordinated the right of the noncompetent nonterminally ill patient
to forego medical treatment and the concomitant choice to not be
sustained in a persistent vegetative state to the state's interest in the
preservation of life.' 88 This subordination of the patient's right may
be deemed an anomaly because the right to refuse medical treatment
is predicated upon the fundamental right of privacy guaranteed by
the Constitution.189 However, the Cruzan court did not consider this
an incongruous result; it simply failed to recognize that the noncom-
petent patient has the right to refuse medical treatment. Thus, not
only did the Cruzan court completely abridge the exercise of the
right to refuse medical treatment, but it failed to even acknowledge
the existence of such a right.
V. CONCLUSION
It is well established that the competent patient has the right to re-
fuse life sustaining medical treatment based upon the common law
right of bodily integrity, the constitutional right of privacy, and the
statutory rights embodied in natural death acts. Moreover, courts
have extended the right to refuse medical treatment and the concom-
itant choice to "die with dignity" to the noncompetent terminally ill
patient, primarily due to the terminal condition of the patient charac-
terized by imminent death and the absence of hope of recovery.
186. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417. The court indicated that the doctrine of informed
consent contained three prerequisites: (1) the patient must have the ability to reason
and make decisions; (2) the decision must be voluntary and made without force; and
(3) the patient must understand the nature of the illness, the prognosis, and the risks
and benefits of treatment or nontreatment. Id. Moreover, the court stated that "[in
the absence of these three elements, neither consent nor refusal can be informed." Id.
Thus, the court implied that the noncompetent patient does not have the right to re-
fuse medical treatment, because the patient is unable to understand the risks and ben-
efits of nontreatment and, therefore, lacks the ability to make an informed refusal.
187. The Cruzan court noted that the state had a two-fold interest in the preserva-
tion of life: (1) the prolongation of life; and (2) the sanctity of life. Id. at 419.
188. Id. at 424 (noting that right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of source
of right, does not outweigh the "immense, clear fact of life in which the state main-
tains a vital interest").
189. See supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
However, because the law is unsettled as it applies to the noncom-
petent nonterminally ill patient, a wide variety of tests and analyses
are employed to determine both the existence and exercise of the
right to refuse medical treatment. The primary tests used to deter-
mine the exercise of this right, the substituted judgment test and the
best interests test, often produce incongruous results and are subject
to great manipulation and inconsistent interpretation. To ensure that
the noncompetent nonterminally ill patient receives the full comple-
ment of rights already accorded to competent and noncompetent ter-
minally ill patients, more workable and flexible standards are needed
to determine both the existence and exercise of the right to refuse
medical treatment. The comprehensive, structured, yet flexible
guidelines formulated in In re Browning provide an appropriate stan-
dard which may be used to preserve and protect the noncompetent
nonterminally ill patient's right to refuse medical treatment, while
maintaining the integrity of the state's counterbalancing interests.
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